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Following the UK’s decision to leave the European Union, a great deal of attention has focused on
when the country will choose to begin its exit negotiations. Richard Rose writes that there are both
pros and cons for the British government in pushing back the negotiations. A delay would allow the
government to arrive at a stronger position on what it wishes to achieve from the process, but too
long a delay would risk the discussions being complicated by elections in other European countries
and prolong divisions within the government over Brexit.
The referendum question was simple but the outcome has produced a sequence of conundrums.
The most immediate question – when should the UK formally notify the EU it will leave – has a simple answer in the
abstract: When it is ready. It is also strategically critical, because doing so starts a 24-month countdown until the UK
ceases to have any rights or obligations of membership. The British government wants to retain a maximum of rights
to trade in the single market and a minimum of obligations to accept EU immigrants. The EU will only begin
discussing its position once Brexit is officially triggered.
The prime minister’s decision to hold off commencing Brexit negotiations until next year avoids the costly mistake of
starting them before the three ministers responsible have office space, staff and, perhaps, resolve their turf wars. It
also allows time for clarifying what it means for Britain to take back control from Brussels. But it leaves open for
debate the question: Does next year mean January or December?
Notifying departure in January 2017 would remove
uncertainties that are already beginning to affect many
British-based industries and institutions. It would also
reassure anxious Conservative MPs that Theresa May
is not procrastinating about delivering what they
campaigned for and she did not. However, if the
practicalities of post-Brexit relations begin in January,
British negotiators will be short on details.
Harold Wilson’s remark – a week is a long time in
politics – warns Theresa May of the dangers of waiting a
full year, since this multiplies by 52 the risk of
unforeseen and unwanted events. The biggest risk is a
by election arising in a Tory-held constituency. In such
circumstances, the UKIP candidate can appeal for
support by asking voters to send a message to Downing
Street that Brexit means Brexit sooner rather than later.
Holding off negotiations until spring would increase by
half the time available to Whitehall to prepare realistic
proposals for negotiation with EU officials and begin preparations for revising the domestic statute book to deal with
laws that have depended on the country’s EU membership. French elections in spring are likely to produce a new
president who will back British proposals only as and when it is in France’s interest.
Delaying the application for withdrawal until autumn 2017 has domestic and European political costs. If the prime
minister has not started moving predictably toward Brexit before then, she will face semi-anonymous briefings
against her from pro-Brexit ministers and demands from the Conservative Party conference to get a move on, or
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else. Explanations backed by expert opinion will invite Brexiters to assert they are wrong, again – just as they were
in assuming David Cameron would win his campaign to keep the UK in the EU.
The German election, due in autumn 2017, will place Angela Merkel under attack from a protest party that wants to
reduce the influence of the EU on member states. On past form, she will reject such demands. Even if she loses
office, alternative leaders are likely to refuse such demands, both on principle and in the light of what happened to
David Cameron when he tried to appease Britain’s Eurosceptics.
Delaying the formal launch of exit beyond spring would terminate it at the worst possible time for EU institutions to
sign off on an agreement with the British government. The European Parliament (EP), which needs to approve a
number of features of any agreement, is up for election in May 2019. Even if its party composition remains
unchanged, about half its MEPs will be new to the institution. Committee chairmanships, important for scrutinising
details, will be up for grabs too.
A new set of European Commission leaders will be appointed after the EP election; it will take until autumn to confirm
their names and responsibilities. The turnover of national heads of government in the European Council will be less
dramatic because it occurs gradually. However, any agreement the prime minister strikes with sympathetic national
prime ministers could not be confirmed without a full Council vote and the cooperation of the new Commissioners
and Parliament.
In autumn 2019 EU institutions will be hesitant to make concessions to British demands for exceptional benefits that
might encourage other nations to seek the same. The absence of a binding agreement will trigger a hard Brexit, in
which all the existing benefits and obligations of EU membership will cease. Visible costs are likely to come before
hoped for benefits. The biggest political cost would come from taking too long to deliver Brexit and leaving the
Conservative Party once again divided for the British general election in May 2020.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
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